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Introduction

Several techniques
have been proposed to handle negative information in deductive databases and logic programs. These include, in the AI community, the methods of circumscription [22, 23, 13, 151 , default logics [29, 321 , and autoepistemic logics [24, 191. In the logic programming community, the general idea has been to identify one or more models of the completion (cf. Clark [4] ) of a program as being the intended meaning(s) of the program. These techniques led to the notion of strati&don [2, 311 in which a so-called standard (or canonical) model of the program completion was constructed and it was claimed that this model was the intended model of the program. This approach was extended by Przymusiliski [27] who defined a class of programs called locally stratified programs. Recently, Gelfond and Lifschitz [7] proposed a stable model semantics for logic programs and showed that the stable model semantics extends the stratified semantics.
However, it was soon realized by various researchers that a close investigation of the relationship between these varying formalisms was needed. This is because the number of such schemes for handling negative information is rapidly increasingbefore allowing such an increase, one needs to examine the relationships between different schemes to understand exactly what the differences are, and to determine where the strengths and/or weaknesses of a particular scheme lie. At this point we are aware of investigations of the following relationships: (1) between circumscription and Clark's completion [ 10, 291, (2) between circumscription and the closed world assumption [5, 9, 13, 261, (3) between autoepistemic logic and circumscription [8] , (4) between default logic and circumscription
[ll], (5) between the Clark completion and the Closed World Assumption [16, 301, (6) between autoepistemic logic and default reasoning [12, 201 . In this paper, we study the connection between the supported model semantics for logic programming as developed by Apt, Blair and Walker [2] , and nonmonotonic logic based semantics for logic programming. The latter consists of translating general logic programs into either autoepistemic theories or default logic theories.
We show that there is a close correspondence between the semantics of logic programs under these differing semantical characterizations.
Supported models and stable models
We assume that the reader is familiar with the usual notions of term, atom, etc. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, the languages we consider contain function symbols. Any unexplained notation may be assumed to be the same as that in Lloyd For the sake of notational simplicity, we will assume that the body of any clause is written as
where the &'s and 4's are all atomic. Thus, in the body of any clause, the negative atoms occur after the positive atoms. As conjunction is commutative in nature, there is no loss of generality, as long as we deal with semantics with a commutative interpretation of conjunction only, in making this assumption. We may, in fact, assume that a general logic program P is a possibly infinite set of ground clauses. This is the same simplifying assumption made by Gelfond and
Lifschitz [7] . Unless explicitly mentioned otherwise, throughout this paper, we assume that P is a possibly infinite set of ground clauses. The completion of P is defined in the same way as in Lloyd [16] We now give the standard definition of stable models due to Gelfond and Lifschitz r71.
Definition 4.
Suppose P is a logic program, and Z an interpretation.
The GelfondLifschitz transformation, G( Z, P) of P w.r.t. interpretation Z, is the program defined below.
(1) If C is a clause in P of the form An interpretation Z is said to be GL-stable if and only if I = TG,,.pITo.
The following alternative idea of stability is due to Truszczynski. We describe it below, and then prove that both concepts of stability are identical. Even though, in general, G( I, P) and GT( Z, P) are not identical, it is nevertheless true that the concepts of CL-stable models, and GLT-stable models are the same. As G,(I, P) c G(I, P), it follows immediately that TGs(,,p,Tw C_ TG(l.plTw.
(+)
The proof proceeds in the same way as the proof of (+) above. 0
In view of Theorem 1, throughout the rest of this paper, we use the expression "stable model" to mean CL-stable model. Given a logic program P and an interpretation 1, it may be felt that G( Z, P) could be given an equivalent declarative definition by declaring G,( 1, P) to be the smallest (w.r.t. the ordering of subset inclusion) definite logic program which is a subset of G(O, P), if any, such that TGIC,,pj = Tp( I). Note that in general, a unique "smallest" set satisfying such conditions may not always exist. Even if such a unique smallest set G,( Z, P) exists, it may not coincide with G( 1, P) as the following example shows. In this case, note that Gr(I, P) = 0.
In view of Theorem 2, we may ask ourselves whether it is possible that G,(Z, P) = G,(Z, P). This property does not hold either, as the following example shows. The following result is a corollary of Theorem 2. It tells us that all stable models are also supported. Note that the converse to Theorem 4 does not hold, that is camp(P) may have a minimal and supported model which is not stable (Example 7).
Theorem 3. Every stable interpretation of P is a supported model of P.
Proof. T,(M) = ~G(M,P,(W
Stable models of logic programs are closely related to the Default Logic of [29] .
Specifically, given a program P, we assign to it a default theory (Dp, Reiter's operator Rs as follows (in the sequel, T is a set of formulas):
Here Cn is the consequence operator of classical logic, i.e. Cn(X) is the set of all first order logical consequences of X. Further, we assume that double negations are eliminated,
i.e. the formula ll+ is treated as $.
The following example illustrates the behavior of the Rs operator. Operator RS is monotone and finitary and so it possesses a fixed point above any set W of formulas. Let FL be the least fixed point of Rs above W. S is called an extension of (0, W), if this least fixed point is precisely S, that is FL = S.
We quote the following result due to Marek and Truszczynski [20] .
Theorem 5. M is a stable model of a logic program P if and only if M is a maximal set of atoms such that Cn( W, u M) is an extension of ( W,, Dp). 0
In this fashion we get a close connection between the class of stable models of a program and a classical mode of nonmonotonic reasoning.
In Section 3 we shall establish yet another interpretation of logic programs in autoepistemic logic and with the help of it we also establish another connection with default logic. This ties up supported models with different structures for default logic. The following result is a corollary of Theorem 4.
Lemma 1. Let M be any model of P Then Tcj(M,p,Tw G M.
Proof. As M is a model of P, Tp( M) c M. But by Theorem 2, TG,M,Pj( M) = Tp( M).
As From Table 1 , we can verify that this program has no stable model; however, camp(P) is consistent (the interpretation {p, q} is a mode1 of corn(P) and indeed, this is the only Herbrand mode1 of camp(P) and hence the only supported model of P which is necessarily minima1 by uniqueness. It is however, not stable. If (H,,) ,,.: y is a stratification of P, then P,, is the set of clauses C in P such that the head of C belongs to H,. and for O<a< y Then !Ji, = S, is the standard model of P. The following theorem has been announced by Gelfond and Lifschitz [7] and independently by Przymusinski and Przymusinska (cf. [25] ). We include a proof below since none has been published thus far. Proof. Let gud( P) = U,. y P,, be a local stratification of P. By induction of n < y, we show that every p, has S, as its unique stable model. Base Case: ( TJ = 0) P,, = $4 and S,, = $J and so we are done.
Inductive Case: (7 > 0). Assume that for all [< 7, pi has S, as its unique stable model. In addition, we can assume that I, s 12+ScI G SiL. Case 1: (7 is a limit) . In this case p,, = U,. 7) pi. We need to show that S, = LJi_ S, is a stable model of p,. Consider G (S,, p,) . By the local stratification of P, P,, is also locally stratified. Consequently, G(S,, p,,) = UC. 'I G (S,, pi) . Hence, the least model of G (S,, p,,) is then equal to U,. T) S,. This last set is equal to S,. 
s,u GJbJ(S,).
To see that S, is stable is routine. We shall now prove that this is the unique stable (1) the problem "Is M a stable model for P?" is rI:'-hard. Moreover, it is in II:.
(2) the problem "is P'= G( M, P)?" is ny-hard. Moreover, it is in II:.
Proof. We outline the proof of (l), the proof of (2) is similar. First we show that problem (1) is IIt-hard. This is shown by demonstrating a reducibility to the well-known II&complete problem "Given r.e. sets S, , S2, is S, = Sz ?" Let Q be a pure logic program having success set S, . Then G(S, , Q) = G( S2, Q) = Q. Clearly, S, =Sz iff Totw =Sz iff S, is a stable mode1 of Q.
It follows that the problem S, = S, can now be solved by an oracle query asking if S, is a stable model of Q. Hence (1) is @-hard. We now show that (1) is in II!. As M is r.e. and a P is recursive, it is easy to see that the problem of whether a ground clause is in G( M, P) is Ey. Thus, G( M, P) is a 1: set of clauses. Let F[x] be a Z5: formula containing free variable x that defines G( M, P). It is easy to show that TGCM,,,,t w is r.e. relative to G(M, P). Thus, ) which is a II: formula. to see (2) we notice that comparing recursive set (P') and a A; set is expressible as a II: sentence. 0 Remark 1. Suppose P, , P2 are general logic programs such that no predicate symbol occurring in P, occurs in Pz and vice versa. Then, if M,, M, are stable models of P, , P2 respectively, M, u Mz is a stable model of P, u Pz.
Theorem 7.
There exists a logic program P having continuum-many stable models.
Proof. Take P to be the program r(O) + 44X)) + r(X)
P(X) + 1q(X) q(X) + lP(X) Let R = {r(O), r(S(O)), r(s(s(o))),
. . . }. Any superset X of R such that for all ground terms t exactly one of p(t), q(t) is in X is a stable model of l? 0 Unfortunately, the problem of stable validity of both ground atoms, and negated ground atoms may be highly undecidable as Corollary 2 below demonstrates. (2) the set 9(P) = {A E BP ) PH$, TA} is a IIf -complete subset of B,.
The above corollary demonstrates that the stable model semantics can be highly intractable.
Autoepistemic translation of a logic program
In this section we investigate the relationship between supported models of a general logic program and the logic of an ideally introspective agent. We show that under the epistemic translation ET (to be introduced below) of logic programs there is a one to one correspondence between the supported models and the so-called autoepistemic expansions of translations (cf. [24] ).
Autoepistemic logic was proposed by Moore [24] as a formalism for a reasoning agent to be able to reflect upon her/his own knowledge. We observe that Gelfond [6] has also defined a translation of logic programs into autoepistemic theories, but as will shortly become apparent, our transformation is somewhat different and leads to some interesting connections between supported models of logic programs and expansions of autoepistemic theories. We briefly review the basic results pertaining to autoepistemic logic, as proved in [18, 12, 191 .
Let L denote a propositional language whose logical symbols are the usual symbols of propositional logic'. Cn is the well-known Tarski consequence operation of the propositional logic, sometimes called tautological consequence. L can be extended to a modal language L, by introducing a unary connective K. Every formula 4 of L is in L,, and if $ is a formula of LK, then K$ is a formula of LK. Intuitively, if IJ? is a formula, then KG may be read as "+ is known to be true". When discussing L,, the consequence operation Cn acts on the theories in the modal language as well, except that here evey expression K4 is treated as an atom. Given the language of modal logic L K, a theory T s LK is called stable if it satisfies the following conditions:
(Stl) T is closed under propositional consequence, (St2) 4 E TJK~ E T, (St3) +a T=+lK+ E T Given a theory Z s LK (think about Z as the initial assumptions of an agent), a theory TG L, is called an expansion of Z [24] if it satisfies the following condition:
Hence, as it happens often both in logic programming and related topics, expansion is defined via a fixed point of an operator. Not every theory Z possesses an expansion and if one exists, it need not be unique. The operator whose fixed points are expansions is by no means monotone. One notices that every expansion of Z is a stable theory in LK. In [ 18, 121 it was proved that every Z g L (that is without occurrence of K) possesses a unique expansion. This unique expansion, called below where w E L, that is w contains no occurrences of the modal operator K.
(**)
Hence assume that I consists of implications of form (** To simplify notation objective part of the [ 19] ), the following i
E J}) and for all i E J, A, E T, then T is an expansion of I.
A word of caution is appropriate here. In general, a given theory T does not uniquely determine a set J such that T = Exp({ w, : i E J}). T c I is an expansion of Z if and only if there exists at least one set J such that T = Exp({w, : i E J}) and for all i E J, E, E T.
Before we introduce the translation and prove the results connecting supported models and explanations of translation, we need to introduce one more property of stable sets (and hence expansions as well).
Theorem 11. (cf. [19] ). Let the,formula 4 have the property that for every atom a, every occurrence of a appears within the scope of modal operator K. Then, for every stable theory T, 4 E T or (14) E T
We introduce now the notion of epistemic translation of a logic program. This translation is different from that of Gelfond (cf. [6] ) and in fact relates to the notion of supported model and not to that of stable model. above allows us to derive a negated atom when no epistemic justification is available. Although this formula may be infinitary, it poses no problem as we may assume that Exp(S) is closed under infinitary conjunctions. (c) Finally, we show that T = Exp( 7'/1( M)). Let us notice that the reasoning of point (b) shows that for every atom A E B,, A E T or 1A E T This, in particular, implies that T n L is a complete theory. Now, Th( M) is also a complete theory and In Section 2 we noticed (cf. Theorem 5) a connection between stable models and extensions of default translation of logic programs. Our results of this section provide us with yet another connection with default logic, this time, however, with different structures.
In [21] the connection between autoepistemic logic and default logic was studied in detail and the class of objects in default logic corresponding to autoepistemic expansions was fully identified. These objects, called in [21] weak extensions are defined as follows. is a weak extension of (0, W).
To summarize, the results of this section show that whereas stable models are intimately related to extensions of default theories, supported models are associated (by a different translation) with weak extensions of default theories.
Conclusions
It is always surprising when constructions from seemingly unrelated domains turn out to be closely connected. Our results as well as other results mentioned in Section 1 point to the existence of the same basic principles behind various modes of reasoning considered by the artificial intelligence community and by various interpretations of negation considered by the logic programming community. We can only hope that a single, unifying, approach eventually emerges. The primary aim of this paper is to clarify the various relationships between stable models of logic programs, supported models of logic programs, the default semantics for logic programs and the autoepistemic semantics for logic programs. The first two of these essentially claim that the meaning of a program is just the set of models of the program possessing certain properties. On the other hand, the last two essentially claim that the program's meaning is exactly that of an (appropriately defined) translation of the program into a different logic (viz. default logic and autoepistemic logic). In this paper, we have studied
(1) the connection between stable and supported models (Section 2), (2) the relationship between supported models and default logics (Corollary 4), (3) the relationship between supported models of a program and expansions of the program's autoepistemic translation (Theorems 12 and 13). Thus, these results demonstrate the intricate, yet intimate, relationship between differing formalisms for negation in logic programming.
We strongly believe that a through study of the interrelationships between varying formalisms for treating negation in logic programming and in AI are necessary, as there are far too many such formalisms today.
